An Adept History of Robotics Part 5

The Government Sector

In this discussion I will speak to the history of development in the US, even though
my experience leads me to believe that many of my observations will be true of other
countries as well.
It is widely appreciated that early-stage basic research into revolutionary technologies
is seldom undertaken by the private sector because of the huge expenses and risks
associated with such investments. Funding by the government is therefore appropriate
and essential for a developed country if it is to maintain at least technological
parity with other nations.
In recent decades, two examples of US government sponsored research have shown
how dramatically such investments can pay off. These are the space program and the
Internet. The impact of the space program could never have been imagined when it
was begun as a cold war competition with the Soviet Union! Today, satellites provide
everything from surveys of crops to weather data and commercial television. From a
robotics perspective, the advent of the satellite-based GPS navigation system has meant
that autonomous vehicles have become practical in many environments. The impact
of the Internet is, if anything, even greater than the space program. The Internet
has revolutionized the way we communicate, shop, and search for information, and
opened up countless new possibilities for enterprise.

Robotics research and development in the government sector

Here the story is not so encouraging. The US government has made huge investments
in autonomous robotics, dating back more than two decades. To say that these investments
have failed to meet expectations is a bit like saying that the maiden voyage of
the Titanic failed to live up to the promises in the brochure!
To a large extent, these failures are symptomatic of a broken system, and unless it is
repaired13 they will no doubt continue. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
largest programs were sponsored by DARPA, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force and
the Department of Energy (DOE).

DARPA The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has the mandate of funding research
that is too far ahead of deployment to be undertaken by the various military branches.
The strategy was for DARPA to develop technologies to the point where their technical
feasibility could be demonstrated and they could be handed over to the other
branches for development into operational systems.
The management style of DARPA and the technical competence of its management
are very much in contrast with those of the traditional branches of the military.14
Over the years, they have funded robotics programs through universities, small businesses,
and large defense contractors. These programs have succeeded in demonstrating
the technical feasibility of a wide-range of autonomous applications. Even so, none
of their autonomous robotic programs have successfully transitioned to the various
branches of the military.
While the mandate of DARPA is forward-looking research that is not necessarily
expected to lead directly to fieldable systems, the expenditures of DOE and the individual
branches of the military are expected to be directed toward specific requirements
and to culminate in fielded equipment.

Department of Energy

Some of the most interesting and challenging projects with which I am familiar were
developed under DOE during the 1980s and early 1990s. These included everything
from robotic gantries, to pipe-crawling robots, walking robots, and conventional
wheeled and tracked vehicles.
The applications chosen by DOE were usually well considered from the perspective
of being appropriate to robotic technology. Applications ran from inspecting welds
to removing asbestos insulation from pipes, from radiation surveys of floors to inspecting
drums of nuclear waste. Furthermore, the management of the technical aspects
of the development phase of these programs was in large part quite professional.
Prototypes of many robot configurations were developed and tested, often with encouraging
results. As the cold war came to an end, these projects focused more on decommissioning
and clean-up than producing nuclear weapons. So why were none successfully
fielded?
The primary reason for failure in the case of DOE was related to the fact that the research
and operational funding were sharply divided. Those funding the research would
investigate the needs of the operational groups, then go off and develop solutions.
After a few years they would try to get the operational groups to adopt the systems
they had developed. The transition was often referred to as “throwing the system
over the wall (to the operational groups).” This phrase describes both the process
and the problem.
At best, the operational groups viewed the projects as a wasteful nuisance, and at
worse, they viewed them as threatening. These groups did not perceive any benefit to
themselves if the programs succeeded. This was particularly tragic, because many
of the projects were designed primarily to reduce the exposure of personnel to
radiation! With few exceptions, the operational groups viewed these projects with
disdain and did their best to assure their failure. The failure thus mirrors the problem
experienced by DARPA when it tried to pass programs to the military branches.
To the operational groups the very threat of radiation meant that they had much higher
pay scales than equivalent workers in the commercial sector. These organizations had
attracted people who saw this as a positive opportunity. The two camps became increasingly
polarized. The robotics groups, which focused mostly on remediation (clean-up)
after 1990, often called the operational attitude a “muck and truck” mentality.
As program after program failed to make it “over the wall,” some program managers
identified the problem and attempted to get the operational people involved more
closely in the development process. Unfortunately, lacking a profit incentive, it was
very difficult to accomplish this. In fact, most managers appear to have viewed large
staffs as a positive factor in establishing their power and prestige.
In the mid 1990s, new management in DOE put a halt to essentially all robotics work.
The “muck and truckers” had won. Dozens of small businesses that had hoped to
provide DOE with wondrous new robotic systems suddenly found their one customer
gone. With them went all of the knowledge they had accumulated, and the teams
they had built.

Back to Part 1

Adept Robot Support